Unintentional Actions? Foundations of Negligence in Action Theory and Philosophy of Law

Legally, we are not only responsible for intentional or wilful actions but, under certain conditions, also for unintentional or negligent actions. However, it is questionable as to why an unintentional action is ethically and legally relevant. The aim of this thesis is to clarify how we are to understand negligent actions. I will thus ask whether it makes any sense to speak about “negligent actions” (cf. § 15 of the federal German criminal code) in the first place. The point of departure is the discussion among legal scholars and philosophers of law on the appropriate explication of liability for negligence in tort law. Depending on whether its function is regarded as fault-based liability, compensation for damage or prevention of loss, the concept of negligence is construed in a different way. Another fundamental problem in law is whether, and in what respect the structure of negligent actions in criminal law coincides with their structure in tort law. Based upon a systematic clarification of the positions and arguments put forward in this debate, I will propose an analysis of the structure of negligent actions grounded in philosophical action theory. A central question is the delimitation of negligent actions and omissions. Furthermore, I will examine the relevance of the moral philosophical doctrine of double effect for the ethical and legal evaluation of negligence. The aim is to develop a conception of negligence which can adequately explicate liability for negligence in tort law.

This dissertation project by Katja Stoppenbrink, LL.M., M.A., is conducted at the Universität zu Köln under the supervision of Professor Dr. phil. Michael Quante (Philosophisches Seminar).